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CLASS ACTIONS AND PRIVATE LAW ENFORCEMENT




A major task in the determination of effective law enforcement 
strategies is the delineation of the appropriate roles of public and 
private law enforcement mechanisms. As a general rule, the 
relationships and duties of private citizens inter se are regulated 
through private enforcement. For example, the State’s role in the 
enforcement of contract, tort and property law has traditionally been 
limited essentially to providing a court system. On the other hand, 
the public law system is designed to establish rules of conduct to 
protect the general social welfare and has traditionally been 
enforced primarily by public officials who are charged with further­
ing the public interest in the prevention of breaches of these rules. 1
However, this description of the respective functions of private 
and public law enforcement greatly over-simplifies the complex 
array and mixes of law enforcement strategies to be observed in most 
contemporary legal systems. Increasingly we observe the intrusion of 
public enforcement mechanisms into areas traditionally conceived of 
as falling within the domain of private law. For example, compensa­
tion schemes such as Workmen’s Compensation, no-fault 
automobile insurance and universal disability schemes, environ­
mental and consumer protection statutes, and a wide spectrum of 
other regulatory regimes dealing with economic activities of various 
kinds, increasingly displace or overlay private law rules with 
publicly enforced prohibitions or administrative regulation. 
Similarly, areas of law traditionally thought of as falling within the 
domain of public law increasingly provide additional private law 
oriented sanctions. Of course, historically the criminal laws of 
England were enforced by private parties and traces of this system
* Law and Economics Programme. University of Toronto Faculty of Law. This 
paper is the revised text of some comments presented by Professor Trebilcock at 
the 1977 annual meeting of the Association of Canadian Law Teachers. A 
number of points raised herein are more extensively discussed in Prichard. 
“ Private Enforcement and Class Actions” , National Conference on Competition 
Policy. University of Toronto. May 12. 13, 1977; mimeograph.
1 See Landes & Posner, “ The Private Enforcement of Law” , 4 J. Leg. Studies 1
(1975).
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have persisted to the present d ay .2 Beyond this, however, prohibi­
tory statutes increasingly are framed or interpreted so as to provide 
for private law sanctions for their breach to supplement public 
penalties. More generally, the Law Reform Commission of Canada 
has recently proposed much wider use of compensatory sanctions as 
options in the sentencing process in criminal sanctions.3 This 
proposal implicitly recognizes the substitutability of compensation, 
traditionally conceited of as a major objective of the private law, for 
deterrence, traditionally conceived of as a major objective of the 
criminal law. Indeed, if every unlawful actor had to contemplate the 
absolute certainty of paying full compensation to everybody 
damaged by his misconduct, this would function as a complete 
system of deterrence. Conversely, if every unlawful actor had to 
contemplate the absolute certainty of public penalties fixed at a level 
that would remove all gains from his misconduct, there would be 
little need, from a deterrence perspective, for any private law system 
of compensation.
To narrow the focus more specifically to the subject of this 
paper, these trends are exemplified in recent amendments to the 
Combines Investigation A c t 4 , Canada’s statute dealing with 
competition policy. Historically, this statute has been enforced 
entirely through the medium of the criminal law. However, amend­
ments in 1975 5 in section 31.1 provided for the first time that any 
person who suffers loss or damage as a result of violations of the Act 
may sue for recovery of the loss or damage suffered. Further amend­
ments, contained in Bill C-42 b , before Parliament at this writing, 
would, in addition to instituting administrative review and control of 
certain practices, incorporate, in sections 39.1 through 39.23, a 
detailed procedural code for class actions under the Act to facilitate 
and expand utilization of the private right of action introduced in 
the earlier amendments. 7
2 See Rad7.inowic7., A History' of English Criminal Law. v. 2 (1956), pp. 33-170; 
Kurland & Waters. “ Public Prosecution in England 1854-79. “ An Essay in 
English Legislative History” , Duke L. J. 495 (1959); Sidman, “The Outmoded 
Concept of Private Prosecution” , 25 Amer. U. L. Rev. 754.
3 Working Paper, Restitution and Compensation (No. 5, 1975); also Trebilcock et 
al., A Study on Consumer Misleading and Unfair Trade Practices, (Information 
Canada. 1976), pp. 85, 86. 302, 303.
4 R.S.C. 1970, C-23.
5 S.C. 1975, C-2.
6 The Bill was recently studied in the Fourteenth Report to the House of Commons 
of the Standing Committee on Finance, Trade and Economic Affairs (1977).
7 For another recent effort at comprehensive reform of class action rules, see the 
U.S. Uniform Class Action Act, 6 Class Action Reports 639 (1975).
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The balance of this paper is devoted to an examination of these 
proposed class action provisions with two purposes in view: first, to 
assess the likely role of this form of private law enforcement in a 
competition policy context, and, secondly, to seek some more 
general insights into factors which should influence the choice of 
private law / public law enforcement strategies in other enforcement 
contexts, where present arrangements seem often to be more the 
accidents of history and ad hocery than the products of reasoned 
analysis.
II. SUMMARY OF BILL C-42 CLASS ACTION PROVISIONS
The Bill provides that a representative plaintiff may bring a 
class action if he can satisfy the court in preliminary certification 
proceedings that: (1) members of the class are so numerous that 
joinder is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law and fact that 
appear to be common to the class and these predominate over any 
questions effecting only individuals in the class; (3) the representa­
tive party will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the 
class; (4) the proceedings are brought in good faith on the basis of a 
prima facie case; and (5) the class action is superior to any other 
available method for the adjudication of the issues between the 
defendant and class members. In determining (5), the court shall 
determine if class members have suffered a sufficient loss to warrant 
the cost of administering relief. The Bill provides that class status 
shall not be denied on the grounds only that: (1) the relief claimed is 
damages; (2) the damages require individual calculation; and (3) the 
claims arise out of separate contracts or transactions. These 
provisions significantly relax existing restrictions on the bringing of 
class actions as exemplified in decisions such as that in M arkt & Co. 
Ltd. v. Knight Steamship Co. L td .8 In a further modification of the 
common law, the Bill gives the court the power to order that notice 
be sent a class members of the pendency of the suit affording them 
an opportunity to opt o u t.9
8 [1910) 2 K.B. 1021 (C.A.). See also Johnston v. Consumers' Gas Co. (1898), 23 
O.A.R. 566; Preston v. Hilton (1920), 48 O.L.R. 172; A. E. Osier & Co. v. 
Solomon. [ 1926] 4 D.L.R. 345; Shaw v. Real Estate Board o f  Greater Vancouver, 
(1973), 36 D.L.R. (3d) 250 (B.C.C.A.); Famham  v. Fingold. (1973) 2 O.R. 132 
(C.A.). Despite recent developments, these restrictions still appear to limit 
significantly the availability of the class action. See Chastain v. British Columbia 
Power Authority  (1973), 32 D.L.R. (3d) 443 (B.C.D.C.); Naken et al. v. General 
Motors, (1976), 66 D.L.R. (3d) 205 (Ont. C.A.); Cobbold et al. v. Time Canada 
Ltd. (1977), 13 O.R. (2d) 567 (H.C.).
9 For detailed discussions of the present states of Anglo-Canadian and U.S. class 
action law, see Williams, A Proposal for Class Actions Under Competition Policy 
Legislation (Information Canada, 1976); Williams, "Consumer-Class Actions in 
Canada - Some Proposals for Reform” , (1975) 13 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1; Note, 
“ Developments in the Law - Class Actions” , 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1319 (1976).
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With respect to costs the Bill provides that no costs shall be 
awarded to any party to a class action except on: (1) the initial 
application for class status; (2) the settlement of individual issues 
subsequent to a class judgment; (3) an interlocutory motion; or
(4) proceedings based on substantially the same facts on which the 
plaintiff was previously convicted. The Bill provides further that the 
reasonable solicitor and client costs of the representative class 
constitute a first charge on a pro rata basis on the amounts payable 
as compensation to class members.
Finally, the Bill provides for “ substitute actions” by the 
Competition Policy Advocate (the public enforcement official under 
the Combines Investigation Act) in some situations where a private 
class action is not allowed.10 Substitute actions are confined to 
situations in which a class action was denied because there was 
unlikely to be sufficient compensation claimable by individual class 
members to warrant the expense of administering relief. Moreover, 
the Advocate cannot claim relief in a substitute action if, prior to 
judgment, the defendant has been convicted of an offense on the 
same facts.
Although it is not expressly stated in the Bill, it is important to 
note that as a general rule of evidence, the requisite standard of 
proof in these class actions will be the civil and not the criminal 
standard of proof. In addition, a prior criminal conviction for breach 
of the Act is prima facie evidence of the facts on which the conviction 
was based in a subsequent private civil suit against the same party.
in .  AN EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSED PROVISIONS
In this portion of the paper, we wish to address, first, the 
question of why and how private civil actions, facilitated by class 
procedures, can contribute to the proper enforcement of a statute 
like the Combines Investigation Act. Then, secondly, we wish to 
consider whether the proposed procedures are designed in a way that 
will allow the class action to fulfill its appropriate enforcement role.
In order to evaluate critically the Bill’s class action procedures, 
it is essential that the rationale for, and role of, class actions be 
understood. If we conclude that they have a useful role then we 
should facilitate them by efficient and effective procedures. If no 
useful role can be identified, then wide enabling procedures clearly 
become unattractive.
As suggested in our introductory comments, a private civil 
action for breach of the Act is in many ways a substitute for a public 
criminal prosecution. A successful suit can be thought of as a
10 Cf. The U.S. A ntitrust Parens Patriae Act. 6 Class Action Reports 647 (1975).
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“conviction” , and the possibility of such a suit as raising the 
probability of “conviction” . The damages award can be thought of 
as a “ fine” . Civil actions brought without a prior criminal conviction 
increase the probability of “conviction” while suits which rely on a 
prior criminal conviction function only to increase the level of 
“ fine” . It is important to note the relationship between the 
“conviction” rate and the level of “ fines” , because in terms of 
economic analysis, the optimal level of deterrence will, broadly 
speaking, involve a penalty equal to the gains from violation divided 
by the probability of conviction.11 Thus if a violator could anticipate 
a gain of $100 from a particular violation of the Act, and faces a 10% 
probability of apprehension and conviction, the optimal penalty, 
applying this calculus, would be $1,000. The short point sought to be 
made here is that a priori there is a high rate of substitutability 
between private civil actions and criminal prosecutions in achieving 
this optimizing calculus because both affect “ conviction” rates and 
the level of “ fines” .
In examining factors which should influence the choice between 
the two broad enforcement options, the approach we take is to 
compare the relative efficiency of public and private enforcement 
and then to incorporate into the evaluation other considerations 
such as compensatory objectives, the role of prosecutorial discretion, 
and institutional limitations on public enforcement mechanisms.12
11 See Pcsner, Economic Analysis o f  Law  (1972), at 360 et seq.
12 The analysis which follows draws upon a considerable body of literature on 
private enforcement and its role in antitrust policy. The leading works include 
Breit & Elzinga, "A ntitrust Enforcement and Economic Efficency: The Uneasy 
Case for Treble Damages", 17 J. Law & Econ. 329 (1974): Breit & Elzinga, “ The 
Instruments of Antitrust Enforcement” , 23 Emory L.J. 943 (1974); Breit & 
Elzinga, "A ntitrust Penalties and Attitudes Towards Risk: An Economic 
Analysis” , 86 Harvard L. Rev. 693 (1973); Elzinga & Breit, The Antitrust Penal­
ties (1976); Dam, “Class Actions: Efficiency. Compensation, Deterrence and 
Conflict of Interest” , 4 J. Leg. Studies 47 (1975); Landes & Posner, "The Private 
Enforcement of Law", 4 J. Leg. Studies 1 (1975); Mashaw, "Private Enforcement 
of Public Regulatory Provisions: The Citizen Suit” , 4 C.A.R. 29 (1975); Becker & 
Stigler, “ Law Enforcement, Malfeasance and Compensation of Enforcers” , 3 J. 
Leg. Studies 1 (1974); Becker, “Crime and Punishment: An Economic 
Approach” , 76 J. Pol. Econ. 169 (1968); Stigler, “ The Optimum Enforcement of 
Laws” , 78 J. Pol. Econ. 526 (1970); Posner, "An Economic Approach to Legal 
Procedure and Judicial Administration” , 2 J. Leg. Studies 339 (1973); Posner, 
Economic Analysis o f  Law (1972) pp. 320-385; Handler & Blechman, "A ntitrust 
and the Consumer Interest: The Fallacy of Parens Patriae and A Suggested New 
Approach” , 85 Yale L.J. 626 (1976); Withrow & Larm, "The 'Big’ Antitrust 
Case: 25 Years of Sisyphean Labor” , 62 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1976). For Canadian 
commentary see Proposal-, Skeoch & McDonald, Dynamic Change and Account­
ability in a Canadian M arket Economy (1976) pp. 322-333.
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(a) Efficiency
(i) Investigative Efficiencies
A number of factors here favour public enforcement. First, 
there are probably returns both to scale and specialization- 
associated with a single enforcement agency. Secondly, only a public 
enforcement agency is likely to be entrusted with the wider investiga­
tive powers necessary for effective scrutiny of possible misconduct. 
Thirdly, public enforcement does not suffer from the problem of 
appropriability inherent in private enforcem ent.13 If a number of 
private enforcers are spending resources investigating a possible 
offence, each runs the risk that some other private enforcer will file a 
civil action first and thereby appropriate all the rewards since 
rewards are provided through the court-awarded lawyers’ fees 
following a successful suit or settlement. This competition to file first 
to gain the private benefits of investigation results in a bias towards 
the early filing of poorly investigated claims and away from the 
necessary investment in investigative activities. On the other hand, 
private enforcers will often be parties to the transactions in question 
and thus be better able to detect and have stronger incentives to 
identify violators.
(ii) Prosecutorial Efficiencies
Public enforcement is favoured by the fact that no proof of 
damages is required. In some cases this will be a significant 
advantage, in others not. For example, in a price fixing case, 
damages may be fairly readily proved, whereas in a misleading 
advertising case an assessment of damages is likely to involve each 
member of the class proving reliance on the misleading advertise­
ment.
Private enforcement is favoured by the fact that the lower, civil, 
standard of proof applies, which in turn may increase the "convic­
tion” rate and may lead to less restrictive interpretations by the 
courts of impeachable types of conduct than tend to obtain in a 
criminal law context.
(iii) Efficiencies o f  Sanctions
In theory, fines imposed through public enforcement 
mechanisms are the ideal form of correction. Their level can be flex­
ible so that they can be set to reflect the fact that the probability of 
conviction is likely to be less than one, whereas damages are limited 
to the damage suffered and cannot generally take account of the
13 Posner, Economic Analysis o f  Law (1972) at 378-79.
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“conviction” rate. Again, publicly enforced fines avoid the need to 
prove the amount of damage caused by the violation in the way that 
damages in civil suits must be proved. Finally, fines avoid any costs 
of distributing the penalty, whereas damages can be expensive to 
distribute to individual members of the class.
(b) Compensation
Considerations of equity argue for permitting a party or class of 
parties who have suffered damages from unlawful behaviour to 
recover compensation from the violator. But equity here, as else­
where, is not costless. In evaluating the costs and benefits of permit­
ting civil compensation, three types of claims can usefully be differ­
entiated. 14 First, there are those which, whether brought either 
individually or as a class, are so small that the costs of ensuring 
compensation exceed the compensation due. Bill C-42 does not allow 
private class actions in these circumstances, although the 
Competition Policy Advocate may bring a substitute action and have 
the global damages suffered by the class, where quantifiable, paid 
into the Consolidated Revenue Fund. O f course, if the deterrent 
function of privately brought class actions is thought to be 
predominant and there are efficiency considerations favouring them 
over public enforcement, it is not clear that the non-achievement of 
significant compensatory objectives should be fatal to the bringing 
of a private class action. Here, depending on the costs rules that 
govern, the incentive to bring such a suit will rest almost wholly with 
the lawyer for the class. Special provision would have to be made for 
the disposition of a class recovery in such a case, perhaps similar to 
that proposed for the Advocate’s substitute action. The question of 
the resulting role of lawyer as entrepreneur arguably promoting 
simultaneously his private self-interest and the public interest in 
effective deterrence of anti-social behaviour is adverted to later in 
this paper.
The second class of claims that can be identified is individually 
significant claims which individuals would be economically justified 
in pursuing either in individual civil suits or as members of a class. 
Here, class actions desirably economize on judicial resources and 
parties’ transaction costs by consolidating such claims for a single 
determination.
The third class of claims involves the intermediate situation 
where individual claims would not be worth litigating individually
14 These categories are based on those stated in Note. ‘‘Developments in the Law 
- Class Actions” , 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1319 (1976) at 1356.
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but, in terms of compensation are worth enforcing through a class 
action. These newly facilitated claims, unlike those in the second 
category, or those in the first category forbidden by Bill C-42, repre­
sent a net increment to the workload of the civil courts. The objec­
tion is made that on the assumption that, at least in the short-run, 
judicial resources are fixed, these new claims will displace or defer 
other suits that would otherwise have been allocated the judicial 
resources now allocated to these new class actions, and thus the 
equity effects, when netted out, may not be positive.15
This argument is, of course, correct to a point, but there seems 
to be no a priori reason for assigning a lesser social valuation to these 
new claims than to those already in the system. In theory, one might 
seek to determine how many units of judicial resources are required 
to process old and new types of claims of a given quantum of 
damages, but even if this measurement was feasible, many would 
feel that claims on the resources of the legal system should be 
determined against a somewhat broader set of criteria than this. 
Moreover, as we have already noted, class actions cannot be 
evaluated wholly or even primarily against their contribution to the 
achievement of compensation objectives. The deterrent function is 
central and presumably, in theory, should also be weighed against 
the deterrent functions being served by civil suits displaced from, or 
deferred in, the court lists as a result of the introduction of enabling 
class action procedures. Further, to the extent that private civil 
actions replace public prosecutions, there should be a corresponding 
saving of judicial resources in the criminal justice system.
(c) Prosecutorial Discretion
The availability of individual and class private rights of action 
for breaches of the Combines Investigation A ct breaks the govern­
ment’s monopoly on the Act’s enforcement and thus negates much 
of the existing public prosecutorial discretion. This, of course, may 
be desirable if the enforcement authorities are complacent or 
improperly motivated but may be less desirable, particularly in an 
area of complex economic regulation such as that with which the Act 
is concerned, if the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in particular 
cases represents the legitimate weighing of wider enforcement 
strategies and priorities and the advancement of broader economic 
objectives. Appropriate exercise of prosecutorial discretion also 
permits continuous marginal adjustments of policy to be made,
15 See Dam, “Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence and Conflict of 
Interest". 4 J. Leg. Studies 47 at 49-54 (1975).
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without constantly engaging further legislative time which is likely to 
be impracticable.“1
(d) Institutional Limitations
Much of the argument in the Proposal17 upon which the class 
action provisions in Bill C-42 are based is premised on the failure of 
public enforcement of the Combines Investigation Act. Critics have 
noted that enforcement of the Act has been characterized by an 
inadequate allocation of enforcement resources, a complaints- 
oriented, reactive, investigative policy, an unagressive prosecutorial 
tradition, restrictive judicial interpretations of the Act, and hope­
lessly inadequate levels of penalties.18
To the extent that these features of the enforcement tradition 
are regarded as failures (rather than intentional policy goals), and to 
the extent that they do not seem likely to be substantially mitigated 
in the foreseeable future, then to that extent the case for a significant 
role for private law enforcement in this area becomes stronger. How­
ever, analysis to this point discloses some substantial advantages 
possessed by public over private enforcement, and we would urge 
that the first priority in improving the enforcement of the Act should 
be to look to ways of strengthening the various elements of the public 
enforcement process. Constitutional doubts as to the ability of the 
Federal government to range much beyond criminal sanctions in the 
competition policy area would seem to underscore this imperative. 
In this respect, perhaps a mandatory fining formula capturing even 
crudely the optimizing calculus outlined earlier, for example, fines 
of three times the gains from violations, might be a substantial start.
Assuming, however, that, for whatever reasons, an aggressive 
public enforcement policy is not politically or otherwise feasible, 
then the need for a substantial role for private enforcement 
mechanisms under the Act is easily made out. In so acknowledging, 
we would note in passing that this kind of judgment would not
16 Some of the advantages of the constructive exercise of prosecutorial discretion 
could, of course, be preserved by requiring that the relevant public enforcement 
agency receive notice of the commencement of all class actions affecting its 
enforcement domain and conferring on the agency the right of intervention in 
certification proceedings to speak to the larger public policy implications of a 
suit. Grounds for refusing to certify would have to include a residual clause to the 
effect: “or is demonstrated by the Competition Policy Advocate to the satisfac­
tion of the Court to be otherwise not in the public interest” .
17 Williams. A Proposal fo r  Class Actions Under Competition Policy Legislation, 
supra.
18 See Stanbury and Górecki. "C anada’s Combines Investigation Act: The Record 
of Public Law Enforcement". National Conference on Competition Policy. Uni­
versity of Toronto, May 12. 13, 1977; mimeograph.
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necessarily hold in all areas of the legal system where class actions 
might conceivably be assigned a role. This poses a serious problem 
in designing general, across-the-board, class action legislation.
(e) Do the Provisions Achieve their Purpose?
If we accept the need for strong private law enforcement 
mechanisms under the Combines Investigation Act, how well do the 
proposed class action provisions serve this end?
In most respects, we regard the provisions as well-conceived and 
well-framed, and as effectively removing or reducing most of the dis­
abilities that have until now afflicted the evolution of Anglo- 
Canadian class action law .19 However, in the balance of our 
comments we wish to focus on one aspect of the provisions that 
seems to us to be seriously deficient and to carry the potential for 
substantially undermining the constructive features of the provisions. 
We refer to the question of legal costs. The question of costs poses 
special problems in the class action context.20 Existing rules 
produce the following results. If a class action succeeds, the class 
representative, while of course not liable for the other side’s legal 
costs, remains liable for the legal costs of the class and is not entitled 
to require contribution from other members of the class. If his own 
claim is relatively small, it will not be worth pursuing in the face of 
this prospect. A fortiori if the class action fails, in which the event 
the class representative will become liable for two sets of costs. These 
rules operate as daunting disincentives to the bringing of class actions.
Bill C-42, in response to the costs problem, proposes, in effect, a 
no-way costs rule, instead of the usual two-way costs rule, and in the 
event of a successful suit, permits the lawyer for the class to collect 
his costs, on a pro rata basis, from all members of the class.
This proposal, while well-intentioned, fails to grasp fully the 
risks faced by a class representative and his lawyer. Under the pro­
19 For a discussion of these, see Williams, supra, n. 17.
20 We do not deal here with the important question of whether notice of the 
pendency of a class action and of the right to opt out should be required to be 
given to members of the class and on what terms. Bill C-42 leaves this m atter in 
the discretion of the court in certification proceedings, the discretion to be exer­
cised against criteria to be laid down later by regulations. The Proposal recom­
mended that the court be directed to consider both the cost of giving notice in 
relation to the size of class members’ claims and whether class members are 
likely to suffer substantial prejudice in the absence of notice. A random survey of 
a sample of class members to test at reasonable cost support for a suit was also 
suggested in some circumstances. We are generally supportive of the Proposal's 
recommendations. The cost implications of notice requirements seriously affect 
the incentives of class representatives and their lawyers to institute suit. These 
implications are too important not to be resolved in the Bill itself.
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posal, if the suit succeeds, the lawyer is assured reasonable solicitor 
and client costs from the class for his services with respect to that 
suit. But if the suit fails, the lawyer is not entitled to receive his fees 
from the other side, and can only look to the class representative for 
payment. Few class representatives will accept this risk. Under­
standably, few lawyers will accept the risk of non-payment in this 
event. Given the complicated and time-consuming nature of most 
class actions, and the uncertain outcome of such actions in areas of 
complex economic regulation such as competition policy, the risk of 
failure, whoever de facto  bears it—class representative or lawyer— 
will deter most suits.
We would propose two alternative solutions for consideration, 
both involving contingent fee components.21
The first would be to retain the traditional two-way costs rule, 
which is economically sound in that it ensures that the losing party 
bears the full costs that his conduct has inflicted on the other party, 
but with the following modifications. In the event of a class action 
being successful, the class would recover its damages from the 
defendant and its lawyer his costs from the defendant reflecting the 
value of time invested in the suit multiplied by a factor to compen­
sate him for the risk of non-compensation in the event of the suit 
having failed. If the suit in fact fails, the lawyer for the class would 
have no claim for costs against the class or its representative, and in 
respect of the defendant’s costs, we would propose that he be made 
personally liable for these (to discourage unmeritorious suits), thus 
freeing the class or its representatives of any such liability. The 
comoensation received by the lawyer for the class in successful suits 
must, of course, reflect the risk of this liability.
The second alternative would be to adopt the no-way costs rule 
proposed in Bill C-42, but provide for compensation to the lawyer 
from the class fund in successful suits on a basis which reflects the 
risk of non-compensation in the event of an unsuccessful suit, where 
no costs would be recoverable (to discourage unmeritorious suits).
The advantage of the second alternative over the first is that it 
reduces the variance in risk faced by the lawyer for the class by 
removing liability for the defendant’s costs in the event of an unsuc­
cessful suit and reducing his costs recovery in successful suits accord­
ingly. In small legal markets such as exist in Canada, the limited 
volume of class actions may prevent desired diversification of risks
21 A further alternative proposed by the Ontario Task Force on Legal Aid, 
(Ministry of the Attorney-General, 1974), Chap. 11, is the financing of some class 
actions through provincial legal aid programmes.
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by legal firms through the spreading of risks across a number of 
suits. The advantage of the first alternative over the second is that it 
faces a defendant, if liable, with the full social costs of his miscon­
duct, and the plaintiff, if unsuccessful, with the costs that he has 
unjustifiably inflicted on the defendant. By merely manipulating the 
multiplier applied to the value of the lawyer’s time under either 
alternative, perhaps by regulation, government could very simply 
regulate the volume of class actions.
Contingent fee arrangements are, of course, anathema to many 
people inside and outside the legal profession. While there are, no 
doubt, aspects of such arrangements that call for careful scrutiny, 
e.g. judicial supervision of settlements and the scale of costs 
recoveries, the sweeping rejection of them in principle often advocat­
ed by critics seems unreasoned. First of all, six provinces of Canada 
permit contingent fee arrangements of one kind or another, without 
apparently producing the social hari-kari forecast by the critics.22 
Secondly, even in jurisdictions, like Ontario, which do not permit 
contingent fee arrangements, in fact much civil litigation is de facto  
conducted on such a basis, e.g. a substantial fee in the event of 
success, disbursements only in the event of failure. Moreover, the 
Taxing Master explicitly recognizes that the results obtained in 
litigation are a factor to be weighed in taxing a lawyer’s bill of 
costs.23 Thus, some of the objections to contingent fees seem a little 
precious. Thirdly, and more importantly, throughout our economy 
we observe specialized risk bearers, through product warranties, 
offering to assume risks — at a price — that other people would 
prefer not to bear. By specializing in risk bearing, these firms are 
able to diversify away some of the risks assumed in a way that the 
individual risk bearer is commonly unable to do. The lawyer under a 
contingent fee arrangement is performing exactly the same function. 
In return for the prospect of a higher fee in the event of a successful 
suit, he agrees to absorb all the costs of a losing suit and absolve his 
client from them. In principle, and subject to safeguards against
22 Williston, “ The Contingent Fee in C anada”, (1967), 6 Alta. L. Rev. 184; Arlidge, 
“Contingent Fees", (1974), 6 Ottawa L. Rev. 374; Bulbullia, "Contingent Fee 
Contracts: Policy and Law in New Brunswick” , (1971), 49 C.B.R. 603; Lovekin, 
"The Contingent Fee", (1961) Chitty’s L.J. 97. The status of contingent fees is at 
present under review in at least two provinces. In Ontario, the Law Society of 
Upper Canada is considering the removal of the present prohibition (National, 
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identifiable forms of abuse, what could possibly be objectionable 
about this?
The failure of Bill C-42 to recognize, and accept, the implica­
tions of the entrepreneurial role that the lawyer will inevitably play 
in orchestrating most class actions — i f  we need them  — is a crip­
pling shortcoming. The absence of any modification of the rules 
relating to maintenance, champerty, and solicitation of business, 
compounds this shortcoming. In framing Bill C-42, the incentive 
structures facing class representatives and their lawyers have simply 
not been realistically analyzed. The incentive structure facing the 
class lawyer, whose stakes in a suit will often be greater than those of 
most class members, is the most critical, albeit unexalted, aspect of 
this analysis. The reluctance exhibited by the Federal government in 
Bill C-42 to harness realistic enforcement procedures in the service 
of important substantive rights reflects a persistent tendency in 
Canadian law-making to turn enlightened substance into futile 
gesture by a myopic focus on the elegance of laws as framed and not 
on the efficacy of laws as enforced.
